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ABSTRACT
The pension system of the Republic of Croatia is subject to frequent inquiries, which can be summed up 
in two basic directions: the question of its financing, ie the rate of pension contributions that negatively 
affect the competitiveness of the economy, and the issue of pensions paid, which are often perceived 
as insufficient for the dignified life of pension beneficiaries. However, in the long run, the pension 
system will face the need for a thorough reform that will be caused by the longer life expectancy of 
the population and the increasing negative demographic tendencies that are particularly pronounced 
in the Republic of Croatia. The current contribution-based pension system will be less and less able 
to service its growing demands, and the reform needs to achieve two apparently conflicting goals: 
efficient financing while stimulating the competitiveness of the Croatian economy. It will be possible 
to achieve this by carefully devising a change in the tax structure and shifting the focus from income 
taxation to consumption taxation.
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1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENSION SYSTEM
The system of generational solidarity is attributed to the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, 
who delivered a speech in 1881 in the Reichstag advocating that people who are too old to work 
or who cannot work and generate income be afforded a dignified life (Stein, 1897?). The term 
“peculium”, which represents the amount of money that was allowed in the ancient Rome for 
slaves to dispose of and save for the purpose of redeeming liberty towards the end of his working 
life, which Bismarck then used in his speech, is at the root of the word “pension” which has grown 
worldwide (Sinn, 2004). The Bismarck bill was passed by the German Parliament in 1889 and 
subsequently adopted by numerous other states (Herbay, 2014). However, due to the changed 
circumstances today, this system is facing new challenges. Countries with the Bismarck system 
spend on average about ten percent of their gross domestic product on pensions (Conde-Ruiz and 
Gonzalez, 2016).
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The first forms of pension funds and paid pensions in Croatia appeared in the mid-nineteenth 
century and were related to particular occupations, such as government officials and servants, 
and soldiers and their families. At the end of the nineteenth century, the beginnings of German 
pension insurance reached Croatia through Austria-Hungary, which is still being applied today 
in a somewhat changed form. Mining fraternities and mutual assistance organizations were 
established throughout Croatia, followed by the establishment of similar associations of workers in 
the construction and railways (Puljiz, 2007). Due to the outbreak of World War I and subsequently 
to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the pension system at the time failed to 
materialize, and workers’ mutual assistance organizations went bankrupt. In 1922, a law was enacted 
to provide for uniform compulsory insurance of workers against the risks of old age, disability and 
death. In the same year, the Central Office for the Insurance of Workers, or the ancestor of today’s 
Croatian Pension Insurance Institute, was established in Zagreb. The general workers ‘pension 
scheme did not apply until 1937 because of adverse economic and political circumstances and 
because the social partners at the time could not reach an agreement on its financing, but the 
Central Office for Workers’ Insurance still paid pensions to certain categories of insured persons, 
those taken over the succession of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and those who have acquired 
a pension due to an accident at work or an occupational disease. Pension insurance was funded by 
contributions of three percent on wages and was paid by employers and workers. The retirement 
age was 70 years, like the one in German law of 1889, so that workers’ pensions were hard to 
come by even if the functioning of the system was not hampered by the political and economic 
difficulties of the time. It is interesting that today’s Croatian Pension Insurance Institute changed 
its name several times, but it is still housed in the same building that the then established Central 
Office for Insurance of Workers had built. After the end of World War II, the Central Institute for 
Social Security was established, and pension insurance based on generational solidarity was part 
of a single social security system. In the first period after the end of the war, the pension scheme 
was restricted to workers, war participants and war victims, while craftsmen and individual 
farmers remained outside the pension system. They were introduced into the system in the late 
1960s and early 1980s, and their pensions were much lower than workers’ pensions (Puljiz, 2008). 
From today’s perspective, it seems almost unbelievable that in 1946 only 10,104 people received 
pensions (Brkašić et al, 2002). In 1971, there was a separation of pension from health insurance. 
In the years that followed, a number of international social security contracts were concluded 
covering Croatian workers abroad, and direct relations were established with German and Austrian 
pension providers, where about 80% of Croatian emigrants worked.
2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REFORMS IMPLEMENTED
After the independence of the Republic of Croatia, national pension and disability insurance 
funds for workers, sole proprietors and individual farmers were established. The transitional and 
economic crisis of the early 1990s and the war greatly hindered the transformation and functioning 
of the pension system in the early years of independence. With significant evasion of contributions, 
the number of new pensioners increased sharply at that time, with the simultaneous decline in the 
number of insured persons, ie those who had to finance the system based on intergenerational 
solidarity, so that the pension system found itself in a financially difficult situation that required 
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its reforms. The first reform came into force in 1999, most importantly raising the retirement 
age, extending the pension calculation period, changing the indexation method and a new way 
of calculating pensions using points, and tightening the criteria for obtaining disability pensions 
(Vukorepa, 2015).  The measures were aimed at mitigating or stopping negative trends and 
stabilizing the situation and developments in the pension system. The emphasis of the 1999 reform 
was on financial sustainability rather than on expenditure cuts because once acquired pension 
rights are permanently guaranteed and cannot be reduced (Marušić, 2003). Although the measures 
temporarily improved the financial sustainability of the system in terms of reduced inflows of 
new retirees and lower growth in pension expenditures, they led to a significant difference in the 
amount of pensions acquired before and after the reform came into force. This disruption was 
corrected during 2007 and 2008, raising pension expenditures again, but with the difference that 
this increase is paid from the state budget (Butarin, 2020).
In 2002, under the influence of the World Bank, a new pension reform began (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 
2009). This reform, based on three pillars, aimed at diversifying pension sources, increasing 
individual accountability for pensions and contributing to the long-term financial sustainability of 
the system (Puljiz, 2011). However, it should be noted that during the 2008 global recession, due to 
the fall in securities prices on the global financial markets, the viability of pension pain funds was 
called into question, which indicated that such a pension system had weaknesses (Olgić Draženović 
et al, 2018). In 2010, a gradual leveling of the conditions of age for women and men was adopted, 
an attempt was made to reward persons who became eligible for full retirement age and remain 
in the world of work, and discontinued early retirement. The aforementioned discouragement of 
early retirement through smaller pensions was not a penalization, but had a mathematical and 
economic justification, since such pensioners pay shorter and thus pay less for the system, while on 
the other hand they draw pension relatively longer (Vukorepa, 2011).
Today’s pension system in Croatia, at least in formal terms, is a combination of a system of 
generational solidarity and capitalized savings. In addition to the security component, individual 
capitalized savings brings a component of equity to the pension insurance, since the insured person 
receives a pension that is in line with his / her previously paid contributions (Dujmović, 2011). It is a 
personal, individual savings of each policyholder that is capitalized which means that it is increased 
by a certain yield. Although funds from the insured are collected and managed by pension funds, 
which are divided into three risk groups according to investment strategies, the payment of 
pensions is made exclusively through mandatory pension companies. The first, main pension pillar 
is the system of generational solidarity, and it pays three quarters of the pension contributions, 
or 15 percent. The second pillar is a compulsory pension pillar of capitalized individual pension 
savings, in which 5 percent, or one quarter of pension contributions, is paid, while the third pillar 
represents additional, voluntary pension savings. However, there were also problems with the 
different pension levels of persons born between 1952 and 1961 who were able to choose whether 
to enter the second pillar or remain only in the first and persons born after 1961 who were by 
law had to enter the second pillar. Namely, the total pension to be paid from both pillars is lower 
than that paid only from the first pillar due to insufficient accumulation of funds in the second 
pillar. There were two reasons for this: a short pay period and insufficient growth in second-pillar 
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allocations, as was intended at the time of the adoption of the 2002 pension reform. Allocations 
for the second pillar have gradually increased to 10 percent, but so far have remained at the initially 
adopted 5 percent. This has led to the calculation of pensions for persons in both pension pillars 
being less favorable than for persons in the first pillar only. The most recent pension reform, the 
one from 2019, stipulates that future retirees receive a statutory allowance of 27 percent for a 
portion of the pension relating to second-tier funds if they are transferred from the second tier 
to the first tier or an allowance of 20.25 percent for pensions from the second pillar if the insured 
person does not wish to transfer these funds to the first pillar. The same reform penalized early 
retirement and wanted to raise the retirement age to 67. These changes sought to equalize the 
amount of pensions on the one hand, and to some extent relieve the pension system in the longer 
term, but due to public pressure, the shift in the age limit has been halted for the time being.
3. FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PENSION SYSTEM OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
When Europe’s first pension systems were in place, the retirement age was generally between 65 
and 70 years. Due to the circumstances at the time and the average life expectancy at the time, 
this limit was such that few people even reached retirement, and if so, retirement generally did not 
last long. However, after the end of World War II, there is a significant reduction in the retirement 
age. A little later, due to the high unemployment occurring in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the practice of early retirement expanded into the life of the insurer in the 1950s. So, too, the 
institution of early retirement took root in Croatia, and in the mid-1990s, the average insured’s 
retirement age was only 54 (Puljiz, 2005). In European countries, it was believed that this would 
solve the unemployment problem, that is, it would create more jobs for young unemployed people 
and that it would stimulate growth. By forcibly passivising one part of the working population 
contingent, the opposite was generally achieved: employers used early retirement to reduce labor 
and rationalize costs, and a large number of new retirees significantly increased the pressure on 
already overburdened pension funds. In Croatia, too, the pension system has been widely used 
as a means of alleviating social problems and rising unemployment. Within the pension system, 
economic problems that, by their very nature, belonged more to other social subsystems, such as 
social welfare in the narrow sense or the unemployment program, were often addressed at high 
and long-term costs (Marušić, 2003).
After 2000, a large decline in the number of insured persons was stopped, and since then their 
number has stagnated and ranges from 1.4 to 1.6 million, but on the other hand, the number of 
pensioners is increasing. Chart 1 shows trends in the number of insured persons and the number 
of pension beneficiaries.
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Chart 1. Trends in the number of insured persons and the number of pension beneficiaries in the 
Republic of Croatia, in millions
 
Source: HZMO (2019)
A look at the trends in the number of insured persons and the number of pension beneficiaries 
indicates the financial unsustainability of the pension system under the current conditions. The 
curve of the number of pension beneficiaries is steadily increasing, reaching 1.2 million at the end 
of 2018, while the curve of the number of insured persons, after a noticeable major decline in the 
early and mid-1990s, is stagnant and is about 1.5 million. The movement of the curves indicates 
that they may intersect in the near future, that is, there may soon be more pension beneficiaries 
than insured persons. It is a process that may be slowing down, but it is unlikely that trends can 
change and that process can be avoided. The difference in the number of insured persons and 
pension beneficiaries decreased from more than 1.3 million in 1990 to less than 0.3 million in 2018. 
An indicator that better describes this problem and is often used is the ratio of the number of 
insured persons to the number of pension beneficiaries, which is shown in chart 2.
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In 1980, 4.04 insured persons paid contributions to one pension beneficiary. Funding for the 
pension system was significantly different in such circumstances than it is today, when only 1.22 
insured persons pay contributions to one pension beneficiary. Although the most noticeable 
negative change occurred from the beginning to the mid-1990s, this ratio has been in constant 
decline throughout the period under review. As early as the 1980s, this ratio had fallen by 
more than 25 percent, or decreased from 4.04 to 3.00. In addition to the economic reasons and 
retirement conditions of that time, an important share in the mentioned change can be attributed 
to the factor of declining birth rate, or changes in the age structure of the population. This factor 
influences the decrease in the ratio over the whole observed time. A relatively larger decline, 
but in absolute terms very similar, occurred during the transition crisis and the war: from 3.00 to 
1.81, or almost 40 percent. The decline in the ratio continues all the time, which indicates even 
more unfavorable ratios between the number of insured persons and the number of pension 
beneficiaries. The number of pension beneficiaries per 100 insured persons is shown in chart 3. 
This number is also called the system dependency ratio.
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Chart 3. Movement of the number of pension beneficiaries per 100 insured persons
 
Source: HZMO (2019), author processing
The system’s dependency ratio in Croatia since the second half of the 1990s is among the highest 
in the world. The figure of 82 pension beneficiaries per 100 insured persons in 2018, and its 
continuous increase since 1980, confirms two already pointed facts: first, that in the foreseeable 
future the number of pension beneficiaries will be equal to or greater than the number of insured 
persons, and second, that the amount of contribution based pensions will be so small that it will 
not be sufficient for life. Namely, assuming that the number of insured persons and the number of 
pension beneficiaries are equal, at the rate of 15 percent of the allocation for the first pension pillar, 
ie the generation solidarity pillar, the total cumulated pension funds will make up 15 percent of 
the total salaries. According to this, the average pension, if financed solely by contributions, would 
be in the amount of 15 percent of the average salary, which would lead to very unpleasant social 
consequences. Chart 4 shows the trend in the share of the average pension in the average wage 
over the last few decades.
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Chart 4. Share of average net pension in average wage
 
Source: HZMO, 2019; 2019a
The average pension was decreasing by the end of the 1990s, and since then has remained stable 
at around 40 percent of the average wage. In 2018, it amounted to approximately HRK 2,640 
and amounted to 42.3 percent of the average salary. It should be noted that the average pension 
consists of old-age, invalidity and survivors’ pensions, and that the old-age pension is about five 
percent higher. However, it is a low level of pensions that leads to a difficult life for retirees and 
causes dissatisfaction with its comparison with length of service and years of payment of pension 
contributions. Further reduction of the average amount of pensions is therefore not realistic not 
only because of possible resistance, but also because of the fact that this would increase social 
problems. A system of generational solidarity in which costs and revenues are balanced can be 
expressed by the following equation (Willmore, 2004):
pR = swL
where p is the average amount of pension and R represents the number of pensioners. On the left 
side of the equation are system costs and on the right are funding sources. The contribution rate 
s, multiplied by the average wage and the number of employees L, represents the mass of funds 
collected, ie the sources of financing the pensions paid. From the previous equation, the required 
contribution rate can be calculated with the desired ratio of average pension to average salary and 
the ratio of number of employees and number of pensioners:
s = (p / w) / (L / R)
With productivity and wages rising, so are pensions, so the system is in balance as long as the 
number or ratio of employees and retirees is constant. As this ratio worsens, that is, the number 
of pension beneficiaries increases or the number of employees decreases, the system becomes 
unsustainable. It is necessary to either reduce the ratio of pensions to wages, which means reducing 
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them realistically, or increasing the rate of appropriation to maintain the existing level of pensions. 
Both measures are limited because neither the appropriations can be raised indefinitely nor the 
pensions can be significantly reduced.
The solution is either to raise the contribution rate, which would have a direct and negative impact 
on competitiveness and economic growth, or change the way pensions are funded through a change 
in tax structure. It should be borne in mind that raising the contribution rate has an economic 
margin of efficiency and that it would be a measure that would only temporarily solve the problem 
and would significantly impair competitiveness and jeopardize other macroeconomic objectives. 
Grdinić et al (2017) find in the sample of former transition countries the negative and statistically 
significant effects of social security contributions on economic growth both in the short and long 
term. Crnogorac and Lago-Peñas (2019) warn of the problem of the informal economy and tax 
evasion caused by an irreversible tax structure. Deskar-Škrbić (2018) goes a step further and finds 
that fiscal policy plays a very important role in stimulating the Croatian economy. Kotlikoff (2011) 
believes that the system needs to be thoroughly reformed because partial measures can hardly 
bring a viable solution. Moreover, he believes that the partial measures will make the situation 
even worse and that future generations will find the system in an even more difficult state than it is 
today. On the other hand, frequent changes in the tax structure suggest a precarious institutional 
environment that is considered one of the main derivatives of the economic growth of national 
economies (Buterin et al, 2018). Chart 5 shows HZMO expenditures for pensions and retirement 
benefits.
Chart 5. Movements in expenditures for pensions and retirement benefits, in billions of HRK
 
Source: HZMO, 2019; 2019a
Despite pension reforms, pension expenditures in the 21 observed years increased almost threefold, 
from HRK 15.4 billion in 1997 to HRK 39.2 billion in 2018. As this relative and absolute increase in 
the amount for pensions was not accompanied by an increase in the contribution rate, and there 
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was no increase in the number of insured persons, it is clear that the pension system lacks the 
money to function and must be moved from somewhere. Over the past three decades, several 
significant changes in the amount and manner of collecting pension contributions have occurred, 
and are presented in table 1.







1991 9,50 9,00 18,50 
1991 11,00 11,00 22,00 
1994 13,50 13,50 27,00 
1995 12,75 12,75 25,50 
1998 10,75 10,75 21,50 
2000 10,75 8,75 19,50 
2003 20,00 0,00 20,00 
Source: HZMO, 2019a
Since 2003, the pension contribution rate has not changed, totaling 20 percent. Insured persons in 
both pension pillars pay three quarters into the first pillar and one quarter into the second pillar. 
Although since 2000 there have been only salary contributions and no more salary contributions, 
both for the insured and the employer, this is generally not relevant. Namely, for both the worker 
and the employer, the amount of pay is important, one as income and the other as a cost category. 
While workers have the perception that wages are low and that work is poorly paid, employers 
have the impression that the same work is very expensive. Since contributions reduce net income, 
they are unpopular and considered as benefits to the state, and it is less important whether they 
are paid by the employer or the worker.
With the introduction of the second pillar, which pays a quarter of the revenues, since 2002 a 
transition cost has been incurred, that is, the long-term cost of the state related to the settlement 
of the deficit in the first pillar. The lack of money is covered by the state budget, and chart 6 shows 
how much HRK is paid for pensions and pension benefits for every HRK 100 collected pension 
contributions for the first pillar.
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Chart 6. Amount of budget revenues for pensions and pension benefits per HRK 100 of income 
from pension contributions 
 
Source: HZMO, 2019; 2019a, author processing
Since for every HRK 100 contributions collected, in order to pay pensions and pension benefits, 
it is necessary to provide around HRK 80 in the budget, it may be asked whether the pension 
system in the Republic of Croatia is still based on the German model of generational solidarity. 
The unfavorable ratio of insured persons and pension beneficiaries, which implies an insufficient 
mass of pension payment contributions, has led to the need for budgeting to be understood in 
itself. These interventions are increasing year by year. Table 2 shows the comparative movement of 
pension expenditures and contributions and budget revenues.
Table 2. Trends in pension system revenues and expenditures, in billions of kunas
Year
Expenditure on pensions and 
retirement benefits
Revenues from pension 
contributions
Revenues from the budget 
of the Republic of Croatia
1997 13,8 12,2 1,6 
2000 19,5 12,8 6,7 
2003 22,2 13,8 8,3 
2006 24,9 16,6 8,3 
2009 34,4 19,8 14,6 
2012 35,2 19,3 15,9 
2015 36,7 20,8 15,9 
2017 37,7 21,1 16,6 
2018 39,2 ( ) ( )
Source: HZMO, 2019; 2019a
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Pension expenditures grew by 173.2 percent between 1997 and 2017, and contribution income 
grew by only 73.5 percent. To make up for that difference, budget allocations have increased more 
than tenfold. In 1997, the share of appropriations in pension expenditures was 11.9 percent, and by 
2017 it had risen to 44.0 percent. Despite the increase in contributions collected in absolute terms, 
the focus of pension payments is slowly but surely shifting from contributions to taxes.
4. CONCLUSION
All the data presented indicate that contributions can be less and less counted and that in Croatia 
the system of generational solidarity as such, at least when it comes to pensions, does not exist in its 
original form. The payment of pensions and the functioning of pension insurance are increasingly 
dependent on Croatia’s budgetary capabilities, so significant system reforms need to be made to 
take into account the objective constraints on the age structure of the Croatian population and 
the importance of the impact of the tax structure on the competitiveness of the economy.
The features of the major changes made to the Pension Insurance Act so far and a series of minor 
changes to the relevant laws are attempts to reduce the financial pressure in the long run, that is, 
attempts to create the assumptions for the long-term sustainability of the system. However, due to 
problems on the revenue side of the system, such changes do not mean much in the long run. The 
demographic problems faced by Croatia are directly linked to the future functioning of a pension 
system based on generational solidarity and are one of the factors behind its greatest limitation. 
Contributions have a distortive effect and, by themselves, adversely affect the competitiveness of 
the economy. Therefore, substantially increasing the contribution in order to possibly better fill 
the first pillar, that is, the pillar of generational solidarity, is neither a realistic nor economically 
wise nor justified option. Resolving the demographic issue is certainly at the heart of resolving 
this issue, but the effects of a pro-natalist policy would only be noticeable in a few decades, if it 
were to be adopted and successfully implemented. In the meantime, it is necessary to ensure the 
functioning of the system, that is, to take care of the revenue side in the conditions that are given 
and which can be predicted with greater or less certainty. This means that there is a need to change 
the regulatory framework, which primarily means a change in the tax structure and a shift from 
income taxation, ie from the collection of pension contributions towards a greater reliance on 
consumption taxation.
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SAŽETAK
Mirovinski sustav Republike Hrvatske podložan je čestim propitivanjima koja se mogu svesti u dva 
temeljna smjera: pitanje njegovog financiranja, odnosno stopa doprinosa mirovinskog osiguranja 
koji negativno utječu na konkurentnost gospodarstva te pitanje visine isplaćenih mirovina koje su 
vrlo često percipirane kao nedovoljne za dostojanstveni život korisnika mirovina. Međutim, u dugom 
roku, mirovinski sustav suočit će se s potrebom temeljite reforme koju će uzrokovati sve dulji životni 
vijek stanovništva te sve izraženije negativne demografske tendencije koje su u Republici Hrvatskoj 
osobito snažno izražene. Sadašnji način financiranja mirovinskog sustava temeljen na doprinosima 
sve će manje biti u stanju servisirati njegove rastuće zahtjeve pa reformom treba postići dva naoko 
suprotstavljena cilja: učinkovito financiranje uz istovremeni poticajni utjecaj na konkurentnost 
hrvatskog gospodarstva. To će biti moguće ostvariti pažljivim osmišljanjem promjene porezne 
strukture i premještanjem težišta s oporezivanja dohotka prema oporezivanju potrošnje.
Ključne riječi: mirovinski sustav, porezna struktura, doprinosi
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